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ABSTRACT
The termination provisions of the U.S. Copyright Act were designed for the primary
purpose of giving creators a second opportunity to make remunerative transfers of
their works at a fair bargained for exchange. In most situations, when a work is first
created and shopped for a deal, for example with a publisher or recording company,
the creator is in a disadvantaged bargaining position vis-à-vis the corporate entity that
is negotiating to purchase or license the work. Subsequently, the deal terms that are
consummated almost always weigh heavily in favor of the corporate entity. Congress,
recognizing this inevitability, included termination provisions in the Copyright Acts.
These provisions are manifested under the 1909 Act via the bi-furcated term, and
under the 1976 Act via the termination window beginning with year 35 after the date
of transfer. This article suggests that in spite of the statutory opportunity to seek
termination, far too often, authors are missing out on these opportunities because they
do not understand how copyright terminations work, or they learn of these
opportunities after the window has closed for serving notice or accessing the reversion
rights. If these termination and recapture rights were indeed provided for the purpose
of leveling the playing field, the statutes need to be revised so as to prevent these
united repercussions, i.e., the punitive effects of creators forever forfeiting their rights
to terminate simply because they did not act quickly enough to access these rights.
This article provides a historical framework, and a roadmap for how the statute can be
revised so that the original intent is satisfied.
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UNINTENDED REPERCUSSIONS: COPYRIGHT TERMINATION AND THE
PUNITIVE EFFECT OF 17 U.S.C. §203(A)(3) ON THE RIGHTS OF CREATORS
LOREN E. MULRAINE*
I. INTRODUCTION
Theory – a supposition or a system of ideas intended to explain something,
especially one based on general principles independent of the thing to be explained.1
Practice – the actual application or use of an idea, belief, or method, as opposed to
theories relating to it.2
Scholarship is often created either in support of a theory, to contradict a theory,
or perhaps to add to the body of knowledge that studies a particular theory. On other
occasions, scholarship is created to contrast the ways in which the theory or intent
behind a particular law, statute or court ruling starkly contrasts with the effect that
it has upon the intended beneficiaries. This is such an article.
This article argues that the language of section 203 of the Copyright Act of 1976
inadvertently creates an undue burden upon original authors, potentially resulting in
punitive consequences.3 Specifically, the restriction to a five-year window within which
terminations must be exercised is unduly punitive to creators who may not be aware
of their termination rights, let alone the strict window within which those rights must
be exercised. The stated intent of Congress, as shown through the development of the
legislative process, was to agilize the exercise of termination rights of authors to
balance the negotiation power of authors with their licensees, which are often
corporations that record, distribute, and publish the author’s original creative works.4
Unfortunately, the termination provisions of the Copyright Act, while well
intentioned, work better in theory than in practice. 5 The specific reasons for this
conclusion will be discussed in this article. This article lays out the history and
development of the statute and the legislative intent of the bi-furcated copyright term
in the earlier statutes and the specific termination window under the life-plus term of
the Copyright Act. This article first looks at a practical scenario that is being commonly
* © 2022 Loren Mulraine is Professor of Law and Director of Music and Entertainment Law
Studies at Belmont University College of Law in Nashville, TN. Professor Mulraine also serves as a
Senior Scholar with the Center for Intellectual Property and Innovation Policy (C-IP2), and of counsel
at a major national law firm.
1
Oxford,
Theory,
OXFORD
LEARNER’S
DICTIONARIES,
https://www.oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com/us/definition/english/theory?q=theory (last visited Nov.
11, 2022).
2
Oxford,
Practice,
OXFORD
LEARNER’S
DICTIONARIES,
https://www.oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com/us/definition/english/practice_1?q=practice (last visited
Nov. 11, 2022).
3 17 U.S.C. § 203 (2022).
4 House Report on Copyright Act of 1976, H.R. Rep. No. 94-176 (1976) at 124.
5 See CDAS, Copyright Termination: A Primer, CDAS LEGAL BLOG (Jan. 18, 2017),
https://cdas.com/copyright-termination-prime/. “While seemingly straightforward in concept,
copyright termination is complex in practice.”
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repeated by authors who find themselves uninformed and/or unprepared to take
advantage of the termination rights that are purportedly designed for their benefit.
Following the establishment of that narrative, review the history of copyright law in
the U.S., the language of the statute, and the legislative history supporting the thesis
of this article will be analyzed. Finally, the article concludes with suggested changes
to the language of the statute that would rectify these unintended repercussions.
II. THE STORY
The following practical story is loosely based on a real-life scenario, that is
repeating itself among many artists:
Artist X has had substantial success in the recording industry over the past 40
years, writing iconic songs and taking his place among the most respected artists of
his generation in his musical genre. Like many recording artists, Artist X was not wellversed, or even aware of the statutory provisions that allow him to terminate his
copyright transfers and retrieve his works from the recording and publishing
companies to which he has been signed. In mid 2022, during a casual conversation with
a friend in the industry, Artist X was asked if he had filed terminations for his songs
and master recordings. Artist X responds, “I’m not sure what that is – could you explain
it to me?” After learning what copyright terminations are and how they work, he is
enthusiastic about filing terminations on his works. He consults with a lawyer, and
they begin to compile a list of the music catalog of Artist X. For the purposes of this
example, we will focus on the seven albums he recorded prior to 2000 since the others
(as of this writing) would not yet have entered into the 10-year maximum notice period.
The list, as compiled includes the albums, release dates, termination window and
notice window for each of the albums. Here is the status report on the works of Artist
X:
Album

Contract
Date

Release
Date

35-40 year
termination
window

2-10 year
notice
window

1

1982

1982

2017-2022

2007-2020

2

1982

1984

2019-2024

2009-2022

3

1982

1986

2021-2026

2011-2024

4

1982

1989

2024-2029

2014-2027

5

1982

1992

2027-2032

2017-2030

6

1992

1995

2030-2035

2020-2033

7

1992

1998

2033-2038

2023-2036
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As you can see, the artist has a problem. Artist X has already missed the window
to give notice of termination for Album 1 and is in on the verge of missing the window
to give notice of termination for album 2. Now remember, Artist X was not aware of
the termination provisions and because of this lack of awareness, he has lost the
opportunity to terminate the copyright transfer of his first album. This result is
contrary to the legislative intent of making sure the terminations would be not only
available to creators, but also the stated desire to eliminate the complexity,
awkwardness, and unfairness of the renewal provisions. 6 Unfortunately, we instead
have a statute that is complex, awkward, and has a high likelihood of operating in an
unfair manner.
III. A BRIEF HISTORY OF COPYRIGHT – HOW DID WE GET HERE?
Under the authority of the U.S. Constitution, “the Congress shall have power…to
promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors
and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries.” 7
The above constitutional provision appears straight forward and harmless
enough. Under the authority of that provision, Congress has created, and from time to
time, revised the federal statutes that govern the rights and responsibilities attached
to the creation, ownership, exploitation, and transfer of intellectual property, such as
patents, trademarks, and copyrights.8 Each of these statutes provides protection for
specific types of intellectual property.
Patents offer intellectual property protection for inventions, formulas and designs
in the form of an exclusive right to make, use, sell, offer to sell, or import a patented
invention anywhere in the United States for the patent’s duration.9 Compared with
copyright, patents are harder to secure, more difficult to maintain, and are shorter in
duration of term.10 There are three types of patents: utility patents, plant patents, and
design patents.11 The current term for utility and plant patents is twenty years from
the patent application date and the term for design patents is fourteen years from the
date of the issuance of the patent.12 After their terms, the patents become part of the
6
USCO, General Guide to the Copyright Act of 1976, USCO (1977) 1:1,
https://www.copyright.gov/reports/guide-to-copyright.pdf .
7 U.S. CONST. Art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
8
See USCO, A Brief History of Copyright in the United States, USCO
https://www.copyright.gov/timeline/ (last visited Nov. 11, 2022) (stating, “[c]opyright law in the United
States has changed often since the Constitution granted Congress the power to provide protection to
authors’ creative works”).
9 GARY MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 278 (2d. ed. 2013).
10 MARSHALL A. LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW 31 (3d ed. 2010).
11
USPTO, General information concerning patents, USPTO (Mar. 14, 2018),
https://www.uspto.gov/patents/basics/general-information-patents; see also Richard Goldstein, The
Difference Between Utility and Design Patents, GOLDSTEIN PATENT LAW (2022),
https://www.goldsteinpatentlaw.com/the-difference-between-utility-and-design-patents-madesimple/. (“There are three types of patents to consider: Utility patent, Design patent, and Plant
patent.”).
12 Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994). This term is the
result of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act of 1994 (“URAA”), which established the present term
for patents sough after June 8, 1995. Prior to the URAA, the standard patent term was seventeen
years from the date of patent issuance. Myers, supra note 9, at 341; see also 35 U.S.C. § 173 (2022).
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public domain. 13 Unpatentable subject matter includes laws of nature, natural
phenomena, abstract ideas, mathematical algorithms, and printed matter.14
In contrast to patents and copyrights, which are exclusively creatures of statute,
the origins of trademark protection are in the common law. 15 Trademarks protect
names, logos, slogans, and other brand identifiers. 16 Trademark law serves two
purposes: protecting consumers from being confused or deceived about the source of
goods or services in the marketplace and encouraging merchants to stand behind their
goods or services by protecting the goodwill they have developed in their trademarks. 17
Unlike the limited term of protection for patents, trademarks can be protected
indefinitely, provided the owner continues to use the mark in commerce and follows
specific filing formalities.18
The term for copyright protection falls somewhere in between the very limited
term for patents and the potentially perpetual term of trademarks. Under the
Copyright Act of 1976, as amended by the 1998 Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension
Act, the general term for copyright protection is the life of the author plus 70 years. 19
Copyrights protect the original writings of an author with the subject matter being
proscribed by the following categories:20
(1) literary works;
(2) musical works, including any accompanying words;
(3) dramatic works, including any accompanying music;
(4) pantomimes and choreographic works;
(5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works;
(6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works;
(7) sound recordings; and
(8) architectural works.

35 U.S.C. § 173 states “[p]atents for designs shall be granted for the term of fourteen years from the
date of grant.” Id. Unlike utility and plant patents, design patents were not extended under the URAA
and are thus still governed by the prior law regarding the patent term. The utility patent term is
therefore keyed to the issuance date of the patent, rather than to the application date.
13 Richard Goldstein, What Happens When a Patent Expires?, GOLDSTEIN PATENT LAW (2022),
https://www.goldsteinpatentlaw.com/what-happens-when-patent-expires/. (“After a certain number of
years, your patent protection will expire…and it will become part of the public domain.”).
14 Id.
15 Leaffer, supra note 10, at 35.
16
See
USPTO,
What
is
a
Trademark?,
USPTO
(Mar.
31,
2021),
https://www.uspto.gov/trademarks/basics/what-trademark. “A trademark can be any word, phrase,
symbol, design, or a comvbination of these things that identifies your goods or services. It’s how
customers recognize you in the marketplace and distinguish you from your competitors.”
17 MARY LAFRANCE, UNDERSTANDING TRADEMARK LAW 1 (2d ed. 2009)
18 15 U.S.C. § 1051 et seq. (2022). The Lanham Act provides a federal registration scheme for
trademarks and service marks that are used in any commerce that Congress has the authority to
regulate and provides an array of remedies against parties that infringe such registered marks.
19 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2022). Copyright in a work created on or after January 1, 1978, subsists
from its creation and, except as provided by the following subsections, endures for a term consisting
of the life of the author and 70 years after the author’s death.
20 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2022).
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A. Copyright Protection in the Colonies
The Intellectual Property (IP) Clause of the United States Constitution has
somewhat of a mysterious origin. The clause was not debated at the Constitutional
Convention and received little scrutiny at the ratification debates. 21 However, the
founding fathers understood the necessity for providing IP protection.22 Inspired by
the Statute of Anne, copyright protection in the colonies was originally unveiled
through a patchwork of state statutes beginning in 1641 in Massachusetts. 23 Clause 9
of the Massachusetts Body of Liberties states: “No monopolies shall be granted or
allowed amongst us, but of such new Inventions that are profitable to the Countrie
[sp], and that for a short time.”24 Massachusetts granted the first U.S. patent in 1642
and the first American copyright in 1672. 25 While Massachusetts codified their IP
statute in its first post-colonial constitutions, the other colonies continued to protect
IP through an ad hoc system of special legislative acts and resolutions, all of which
granted IP creators an exclusive right for a limited duration. 26 After John Ledyard
authored A Journal of Captain Cook’s Last Voyage to the Pacific Ocean, he petitioned
the Connecticut General Assembly for copyright protection. 27 The Connecticut general
assembly responded by enacting the first general colonial copyright statute. 28 A
21 Jacob R. Weaver, The Forgotten History of the Intellectual Property Clause, THE FEDERALIST
SOC’Y (Apr. 4, 2021), https://fedsoc.org/commentary/fedsoc-blog/the-forgotten-history-of-theintellectual-property-clause.
22 Suiter Swantz, The United States Constitution and Intellectual Property, SUITER SWANTZ IP
(Sept. 16, 2016), https://suiter.com/the-united-states-constitution-and-intellectual-property/.

George Washington was a strong proponent for a patent system. In his first Annual
Message to a Joint Session of Congress, he urged Congress to pass legislation on
patents and copyrights. A few months later, the Patent Act of 1790 was signed into
law on April 10, 1790, followed by the Copyright Act of 1790 signed into law on May
31, 1790. Washington signed the first United States issued patent on July 31, 1790
(U.S. Patent No. 1) granted to Samuel Hopkins for an improvement ‘in the making
of Pot ash and Pearl ash by a new Apparatus and Process.’
23 8 Anne. Ch. 21 (also cited as 8 Anne. Ch. 19), The Statute of Anne, also known as the Copyright
Act of 1710, was an act of the Parliament of Great Britain passed in 1710, which was the first statute
to provide for copyright regulated by the government and courts, rather than by private parties. The
Massachusetts Body of Liberties, 1641, was the first legal code established by European colonists in
New England and was composed of a list of liberties, rather than restrictions, and intended for use as
guidance for the General Court of the time.
24 Id.
25 Weaver, supra note 21. Inventor Joseph Jenks Sr. was awarded a fourteen-year patent for the
invention of a faster water-mill engine in 1642. The first American copyright was granted to John
Usher, a Massachusetts printer in 1672.
26 Id.
27 WILLIAM F. PATRY, COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE 18 (1994).
28 Noah Webster, First General Copyright Law – Today in History: January 29, CONNECTICUT
HISTORY (Jan. 29, 2020), https://connecticuthistory.org/first-general-copyright-law-today-in-history/.
All of the colonial statutes are reproduced in Copyright Enactments: Laws Passed in the United
States. Since 1783, the Connecticut statute is reproduced. Id. Connecticut protected the works of
authors of the other colonies, provided those colonies passed laws similar to Connecticut’s. Georgia,
Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, and Rhode
Island also extended reciprocal protection. The Maryland and Pennsylvania statutes had an extra
twist on this principle, declaring that their statute did not go into effect unless “all and every of the

[22:23 2022]

UIC Review of Intellectual Property

28

disjointed collection of copyright and IP statutes followed, with Delaware being the
only colony not passing an IP statute.29 The chart on the following page outlines the
basic provisions of the statutes passed by the various colonies (the shaded boxes
indicate the provision was consistent with the Statute of Anne):

States” passed similar laws. Id. at 6, 11. Since Delaware did not pass a copyright law, Maryland and
Pennsylvania’s copyright laws arguably never went into effect. Compare with G. Thomas
Tanselle, Copyright Records and the Bibliographer, in 22 STUDIES IN BIBLIOGRAPHY 77, 84 (1969)
(listing a number of registrations of title under both the Pennsylvania and Maryland statutes). Since
Maryland and Pennsylvania passed their laws early on (1783 and 1784, respectively), one might
expect they would accept registrations and only later determine, after all the states had had a chance
to consider the matter, whether all the states had passed similar laws. Passage of the Constitution on
September 17, 1787, with its grant to Congress of the power to provide for a uniform federal statute,
and the subsequent enactment of the first federal law on May 31, 1790, rendered Maryland and
Pennsylvania’s possible wait-and-see approach moot.
29 Patry, supra note 27, at 18.
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COLONY

SUBJECT
MATTER
COVERED

TERM OF
PROTECTION

RENEWAL
TERM?

FORMALITIES

Connecticut

Books,
pamphlet, maps,
and charts

14 years

14 years

Filing with the
Secretary of State

Delaware

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

14 years

Filing with the
Secretary of State

ADDITIONAL
NOTES

N/A

Georgia
Books,
pamphlets,
maps, and
charts

14 years

Registration
required not as a
prerequisite to
protection, but to
prevent innocent
infringement

Maryland

Books and
writings

14 years

OTHER
REQUIREMENTS

Forfeiture of all
infringing copies
and a fine of
double their value.

The author was required
to provide a sufficient
number of copies at a
“reasonable price.”

N/A

N/A

Forfeiture of all
infringing copies
and a fine of
double their value.

The author was required
to provide a sufficient
number of copies at a
“reasonable price.”

2 pence per
printed sheet

21 years

No provisions on
registration

Minimum fine of
pbp5 and
maximum of
pbp3,000

No provisions on
registration

Minimum fine of
pbp5 and
maximum of
pbp1,000

New Hampshire
Books, treatises,
and other
literary works

REMEDIES

14 years

Massachusetts
Books, treatises,
and other
literary works

29

20 years

New Jersey

Books and
pamphlets

14 years

14 years

Filing with the
Secretary of State

Forfeiture of all
infringing copies
and a fine of
double their value.

New York

Books and
pamphlets

14 years

14 years

Filing with the
Secretary of State

Forfeiture of all
infringing copies
and a fine of
double their value.

The author was required
to provide a sufficient
number of copies at a
“reasonable price.”

Filing with the
Secretary of State

Forfeiture of all
infringing copies
and a fine of
double their value.
Forfeiture of all
infringing copies
and a fine of
double their value.

The author was required
to provide a sufficient
number of copies at a
“reasonable price.”

North Carolina

14 years

Pennsylvania

Books and
pamphlets

14 years

Rhode Island

Books, treatises,
and other
literary works

21 years

South Carolina

Books

14 years

Virginia

Books and
pamphlets

21 years

14 years

Filing in the
prothonotary’s office
No provisions on
registration

14 years

Filing with the
Secretary of State

Filing with the clerk of
the council

Minimum fine of
pbp5 and
maximum of
pbp3,000
Registration
required not as a
prerequisite to
protection, but to
prevent innocent
infringement

1 pence per
printed sheet

Forfeiture of all
infringing copies
and a fine of
double their value.

The author was required
to provide a sufficient
number of copies at a
“reasonable price.”
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B. Federal Copyright Protection
When the U.S. passed the first Copyright Act in 1790, it closely mirrored the
Statute of Anne as it included the initial term and renewal term.30 The Statute of Anne
effectively shifted the balance of power from the printers who had controlled
copyrighted works prior to 1731, to the authors, who for the first time would be
rewarded for their creations.31 It also recognized the value of the public domain by
limiting these rights to a specific number of years.32 New books were protected for a
term of fourteen years for authors and their assigned, plus a second term (i.e., a
renewal term) of fourteen years.33
It should be noted that under U.S. copyright law, Congress provided copyright
protection to creators to incentivize creation of works of value, specifically mentioning
authors in the grant as opposed to publishers, distributors, and consumers of their
works. 34 The following timetable outlines the progression of federal copyright law
protection:
1787 – The Copyright Clause was presented by James Madison and
Charles Pinckney on August 18, 1787. On September 5, the Copyright
Clause was unanimously adopted by Conventional delegates. The U.S.
Constitution was signed on September 17.35
1788 – The U.S. Constitution was ratified on June 21, 1788.
1790 – The Copyright Act of 1790 was enacted on May 31, 1790, as “An
Act for the Encouragement of Learning, by securing the copies of maps,
Charts And books, to the authors and proprietors of such copies during
the times therein mentioned.” This Act established a copyright term of
14 years.
1831 – The term was expanded to 28 years, with an option of a 14-year
extension. This amendment expanded the “writings” definition to
include musical compositions.

30 Copyright Act of 1790, Pub. L. No. 1-15, 1 Stat. 124 (1790). Signed into law by President George
Washington on May 31, 1790. The Statute of Anne was the first act to directly protect the rights of
authors. It did so by granting them the exclusive right to reproduce their intangible creations, rather
than granting the right to a printer or bookseller as it had been in the past.
31 Leaffer, supra note 10, at 4.
32 Id.; see also Howard B. Abrams, The Historic Foundation of American Copyright Law:
Exploding the Myth of Common Law Copyright, 29 WAYNE L. REV. 1119, 1141 (1983).
33 Leaffer, supra note 10, at 5. The second term would revert to the author if he lived to its
commencement.
34 MARC. H. GREENBERG, COPYRIGHT TERMINATION AND RECAPTURE LAWS – GOOD INTENTIONS
GONE AWRY 5 (2016).
35 Scott Bomboy, On this day, the Constitution was signed in Philadelphia, CONSTITUTION
CENTER (Sep. 17, 2022), https://constitutioncenter.org/interactive-constitution/blog/today-theconstitution-was-signed-in-philadelphia.

[22:23 2022]
Unintended Repercussions: Copyright Termination and the
Punitive Effect of 17 U.S.C. §203(a)(3) on the Rights of Creators

31

1841 – Folsom v. Marsh established the common law principles of fair
use (later codified into law).36
1853 – The “writings” definition was expanded to include dramatic
performances.
1856 – The “writings” definition was expanded to include photographs.
1870 – Copyright registration was moved from the District Courts to
the Library of Congress.
1886 – International Berne Convention Treaty was signed,
establishing ownership for life of the author plus 50 years. (The U.S.
would not become a signatory for another 102 years.)
1909 – The Copyright Act of 1909 was enacted. The new act extended
the duration of copyright to 28 years, created a renewal term of an
additional 28 years and expanded protection to music. Under the 1909
Act, an author was required to register the work, place notice on every
commercially distributed copy, and publish this notice to the public for
the copyright term to begin.
1976 – The Copyright Act of 1976 was signed.37 The new act extended
duration to the life of the author plus 50 years and extended works for
hire to 75 years after publication or 100 years after creation (the first
to occur). The Fair Use doctrine was codified. The 1976 Act also
eliminated the formalities of copyright that had been present under the
1909 Act, i.e., registration, notice and general publication, and instead
allowed protection to begin upon the fixation of a work in a tangible
medium of expression.
1980 – The definition of “writings” was expanded to include computer
programs.
1988 – The United States becomes a signatory to the Berne Convention
and Treaty on October 31, 1988.
1990 – The “writings” definition was expanded to include architectural
works.

36 See generally Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F.Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841). In Folsom, Judge Joseph
Story set forth four factors that are in use today and were ultimately codified in the Copyright Act of
1976 in 17 U.S.C. § 107.
37 See USCO, Copyright Law in the United States (Title 17), USCO (May 2021),
https://www.copyright.gov/title17/. The 1976 Act became effective on January 1, 1978.
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1992 – The Copyright Renewal Act of 1992 was enacted. This Act made
renewal automatic for any 1909 Act works that were still under their
first term of protection (i.e., all works copyrighted between 1964-1977).
1998 – The Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act (CTEA) was
enacted. The CTEA extended the duration of copyright to a life plus 70
years term, added 20 years to all 1909 Acts that were still under
protection, and added 20 years to the term of works for hire,
pseudonymous, and anonymous works, which were now protected for
95 years from publication or 120 years from creation (the first to occur).
Also in 1998, the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DCMA) was
passed on October 12. This Act amended U.S. Copyright law to address
important parts of the relationship between copyright and the
Internet.
2010 – The Satellite Television Extension and Localism Act of 2010
was enacted.
2018 – The Orrin G. Hatch-Bob Goodlatte Music Modernization Act
was enacted. This Act facilitated the legal licensing of music by digital
download services.
IV. TERMINATIONS… WHO, WHAT, WHEN, AND WHY?
§ 106 of the Copyright Act provides the owner of a copyright with six exclusive
rights and allows the owner to transfer those rights to others.38 Those exclusive § 106
rights are:
(1) To reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;
(2) To prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;
(3) To distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the
public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or
lending;
(4) In the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic
works, pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works,
to perform the copyrighted work publicly;
(5) In the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic
works, pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works,
including the individual images of a motion picture or other
audiovisual work, to display the copyrighted work publicly; and
(6) In the case of sound recordings, to perform the copyrighted work
publicly by means of a digital audio transmission.39

38
39

17 U.S.C. § 106 (2022).
Id. at § 106(1)-(6).
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Keeping in mind that these § 106 rights are “exclusive” to the author, it follows
that anytime an artist enters a publishing or recording deal, they will be required to
grant one or more of these rights to the corporate entity that is recording, publishing,
and distributing their product. 40 After all, a record company needs the right to
distribute, make copies or perform publicly to market an artist’s music. A challenge
arises, however, when a transfer is made while the artist is at a bargaining
disadvantage, which is essentially all new artists entering recording or publishing
deals.41 This is where the remedial nature of copyright terminations may be available
to give the artist a second bite at the apple.
The statutory language that governs termination of copyright grants is codified in
the Copyright Act of 1976 in 17 U.S.C. § 304 (c) and (d) for pre-1978 works.42 Section
203 of the same act governs works created on or after January 1, 1978.43 Termination
rights under § 304(c) and (d) govern works under the 1909 Act that are in their second
renewal term as of January 1, 1978.44 In other words, works that were already renewed
under the 1909 Act. Section 304(c) allows the author and statutory successors to
terminate transfers made before 1978 in order to recover the 39 years of the extended
renewal term.45 Section 304(d) was added by the 1998 CTEA, and allows authors to
terminate in the event that they did not terminate their rights under § 304(c).46 Section
304(c) and (d) ensure that any windfall resulting from extension should go first to
authors rather than be given to the owner of the existing renewal rights.47
The mechanics of the § 304(c) and (d) termination rights can be broken down into
six questions:48
40 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2022). “Subject to sections 107 through 122, the owner of copyright under this
title has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following….”
41 David Arditi, How record contracts exploit musicians and how we can fix it, THE TENNESSEAN
(Nov. 24, 2020), https://www.tennessean.com/story/opinion/2020/11/24/kanye-west-right-recordlabels-exploit-musicians-how-fix/6062315002/.
42 17 U.S.C. § 304(c)-(d) (2022).
43 17 U.S.C. § 203 (2022) (covering works created on or after January 1, 1978).
44 17 U.S.C. § 304(c)-(d) (2022).
45 17 U.S.C. § 304(c) (2022). This is at year 56, i.e., for works that were in their renewal term –
after the first 28 years – under the 1909 Act. The original 19 years was added on when the 1909 Act’s
renewal term was extended from 28 to 47 years in 1962, as well as the additional 20 years that was
added with the 1998 Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act “CTEA.” Id.
46
USCO,
Notices
of
Termination,
USCO,
https://www.copyright.gov/recordation/termination.html (last visited Oct. 25, 2022). This would be at
year 75, but only if the author did not exercise termination rights at year 56.
47 Lloyd J. Jassin, Copyright Termination: How Authors (And Their Heirs) Can Recapture Their
Pre-1978 Copyrights, COPYLAW, https://www.copylaw.com/new_articles/copyterm.html (last visited
Oct. 25, 2022).

If you miss the opportunity to recapture the 39-year term of copyright (56 + 39 =
95), you can try again at the end of 75 years to recapture the final 20 years of
copyright. This provision allows authors, artists, and composers who missed the
opportunity to recapture the 19-year term extension provided under the 1976
Copyright, to reap the benefits of the 20-year windfall afforded under the 1998
Copyright Term Extension Act.
48 Jeffrey P. Cunard & Brandon C. Gruner, Statutory Termination Rights (Copyright), WESTLAW
PRACTICAL LAW
(2022),
https://1.next.westlaw.com/Document/I49e8e46d8cca11e79bef99c0ee06c731/View/FullText.html?cont
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1. What are the rights that are covered?
a. Grants executed before January 1, 1978, by the author or his
successors.
b. Exceptions are works made for hire and dispositions by will.
2. Who can terminate?
a. The author or a majority of authors of a joint work.49
b. If the author is deceased, the spouse and children may terminate per
stirpes.50
3. When may termination take place?
a. § 304(c) concerns the additional 19 years and may be affected during
the five-year period beginning at the end of 56 years from the date of
copyright, or 56 years from January 1, 1978, whichever is later.
b. § 304(d) concerns the additional 20 years provided by the CTEA of
1998; sec. 304(d) can only be used (1). if the termination rights under §
304(c) expired before the effective date of the 1998 CTEA, and (2) if the
termination right provided in § 304(c) were not exercised; § 304(d)
rights may be effected during the five-year period beginning at the end
of 75 years from the date of copyright.
4. How may termination be effected?
a. By serving written notice.
b. Notice must comply with copyright office regulations.
c. A copy of the notice must be recorded in the Copyright Office before the
effective date of termination.
5. What is the effect of termination?
a. All rights revert to those having the right to terminate.
b. The exception is that derivative works prepared before termination
may continue to be exploited under the terms of the grant.
c. No new derivative works may be prepared after the termination date.
d. Termination rights vest on the date notice is served.
6. Who can make further grants?

extData=(sc.Default)&transitionType=Default&oWSessionId=670459b06f014919961b7cb24fd70d59
&isplcus=true&fromAnonymous=true&firstPage=true&bhcp=1 (last visited Nov. 11, 2022).
49 Id. A “majority of authors” is defined not by the total number of authors of a particular work,
but by the total number of authors on the contract that grants the rights; see also Scorpio Music (Black
Scorpio) S.A. v. Willis, 2012 WL 1598043 *1, *3 (S.D. Cal. 2012); ROBERT BRAUNEIS & ROGER E.
SCHECHTER, COPYRIGHT A CONTEMPORARY APPROACH 772 (2d ed., West Academic Publishing 2018).
In Scorpio, the Court held, in a case where joint authors of a work transfer their respective copyright
interests through separate agreements, a single author may alone terminate his separate grant of his
copyright interest in the joint work. The court found that the term “grant” refers to a single transaction
whereby the rights of one or more joint authors was transferred, because the time for terminating a
grant is calculated from the date of election of the grant.
50 Id. The surviving spouse would own 50% of the termination right, and the surviving children
would equally share the remaining 50% of the rights. As such, in the event that there is a surviving
spouse, the “more than 50%” requirement would only be attainable if the surviving spouse and at least
on surviving child agree to the termination.”
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a. Owners are tenants-in-common51 who can authorize further grants if
signed by the same number and proportion as are required to
terminate.
b. The right granted is effective for all owners, even non-signers.
Both §§ 304 and 203 allow the author or author’s heirs to terminate only if the
procedures established by statute and regulation are followed.52 It is not automatic,
and if the author or the author’s heirs fail to take the necessary steps within the
statutory period, the transfer will continue in accordance with the original contract. 53
These restrictions serve to thwart the original stated intent of including a termination
provision in the statute.
The right to terminate after a specified period under the 1976 Act is an unwaivable right which serves much the same purpose as the renewal term of the 1909
Act.54 The renewal term, or bi-furcated term of the 1909 Act created a certain date, i.e.,
28 years after the copyright date, wherein an original author automatically had the
right to terminate a transfer. 55 However, under the 1909 Act, if the author or the
author’s heirs failed to terminate the transfer at the end of 28 years, the work did not
continue to be the property of the grantee – instead, it entered the public domain.56
51 Id. Tenants-in-common – all tenants in common hold an individual, undivided ownership
interest in the property. This means that each party has the right to alienate, or transfer the
ownership of, her ownership interest. Joint Tenants – joint tenants share equal ownership of the
property and have the equal, undivided right to keep or dispose of the property. Joint tenancy creates
a Right of Survivorship. Tenants in the entirety – an interest in property that can be held only between
a husband and wife in which each party has a right of survivorship over the property and which
neither party can terminate without the consent of the other. A tenancy by the entirety is a form of
concurrent ownership that can only exist between a husband and wife.
52 Id.
53 See 17 U.S.C. §§ 203(b)(6), 304(c)(6)(F) (2022).
54 Leaffer, supra note 10, at 251-52.
55 Stephen K. Rush, A Map Through The Maze of Copyright Termination: Authors or Their Heirs
Can Recapture Their Valuable Copyrights, NIESAR & VESTAL LLP (2003) 2, https://nvlawllp.com/wpcontent/uploads/2018/05/A-Map-Through-the-Maze-of-Copyright-Termination.pdf. “Under the 1909
U.S. Copyright Act, the term was doubled, copyright protection was divided into two separate terms:
an original term of 28 years and a renewal term of 28 years for a total term of 56 years.” The article
further states:

The drafters of the 1909 Act granted rights in the renewal term directly to the
author of the work or his/her statutory designees, intending that the author or
his/her heirs be given an opportunity to sell or commercially exploit the work on
better terms than might have been secured when the author had little bargaining
power with respect to unproven works.
56 See Fred Fisher Music v. M. Witmark & Sons, 318 U.S. 643, 657 (1943) (holding that an
assignment by an author of the renewal term, before that right had vested, was binding on the author).
While the stated congressional purpose of the two-term copyright protection was to protect authors
against unremunerative transfers, the goal was to a degree undermined by case law under the 1909
Act. This led to many deals being drafted for the author to agree to assign his renewal term in the
initial contract. In order to sell their works, authors were often pressured into conveying their renewal
rights in the second term. The dissent in this case by Justices Black, Douglas, and Murphy stated that
the language and history of the copyright law in the dissenting opinion of the lower court demonstrates
a congressional purpose to reserve the renewal privilege for the personal benefit of authors and their
families. See also Miller Music Corp. v. Charles N. Daniels, 362 U.S. 373, 377, 378 (1960) (holding
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This result aligned with the dual purpose of the copyright statute serving to incentivize
creation of new works, while at the same time being mindful of the importance of a
robust public domain.57
For as long as Copyright has been protected by federal statute, authors have had
the opportunity to recapture rights which they may have assigned to other parties
during the term of the Copyright. 58 The Congressional intent of creating such
recapture rights was based on the reality that authors are typically in an unfair
bargaining position in negotiating the value of their original works at the time the
works are created.59 While authors may believe they have written the great American
novel, the next Billboard No. 1 single, or a film that will reach the box office success of
Black Panther, there is no way to place an accurate value on the work until it has been
received by the public.60 In turn, the public will not be able to respond to the work until
it is made available through commercial distribution channels.61 These channels are
mostly controlled by large corporations with enormous bargaining advantages over
authors at the outset of any negotiation.62
that when an assigning author died before the renewal vested, the right to the second term would vest
in the statutory successors under sect. 24 of the 1909 Act). The result of this holding was that
assignees of renewal rights sought to bind all the potential statutory successors, such as the author’s
spouse, by written contract (again contrary to congressional intent). Courts upheld these agreements
as long as they were supported by adequate consideration and were written in express language
granting rights in the renewal term. Fred Fisher and its progeny undermined the basic policy of the
renewal grant, which was to protect the unequal bargaining position of many authors. It should be
notes that there are a couple of very specific exceptions to the 1901 Act.
57 Beth Daley, A Healthy Public Domain Generates Millions on Economic Value – Not Bad for
‘Free’, THE CONVERSATION (Mar. 25, 2015), https://theconversation.com/a-healthy-public-domaingenerates-millions-in-economic-value-not-bad-for-free-39290. “Public domain works – those that exist
without restriction on use either because their copyright term has expired or because they fall outside
of the scope of copyright protection – create significant economic benefits…”
58 Copyright Act of 1790, Pub. L. No. 1-15, 1 Stat. 124 (1790).
59 Dana Halber, Copyright Termination Rights: Giving Artists Their Second Bite at the Apple,
PIPSELF (Apr. 21, 2013), https://pipself.blogs.pace.edu/2013/04/21/copyright-termination-rightsgiving-artists-their-second-bite-at-the-apple/:
When Congress enacted the 1976 Act, which went into effect on January 1, 1978,
the intent of Section 203 was to give authors and artists a ‘second bite at the apple,’
as it’s commonly heard throughout the industry; a chance for artists and authors to
recapture rights to their now successful works that they may have granted to an
industry giant, like a record label or publishing house, for a nominal fee when they
were in a position of little bargaining power.
60 Pamela McClintock, Box Office: ‘Black Panther’ Becomes Top-Grossing Superhero Film of All
Time
in
U.S.,
THE
HOLLYWOOD
REP.
(Mar.
24,
2018),
https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/movies/movie-news/box-office-black-panther-becomes-topgrossing-superhero-film-all-time-us-1097101/. Black Panther opened in theatres on February 16,
2018. By March 24, 2018, it had eclipsed $1.237 billion in global ticket sales, and ultimately grossed
well over $1.3 billion.
61 Jon Ostrow, How to Measure Success with Key Performance Indicators, DISC MAKERS BLOG
(Sep. 2, 2014), https://blog.discmakers.com/2014/09/how-to-measure-success-with-key-performanceindicators/ (discussing the key performance indicators to measure the success of a recording,
including, sales, album sales, ticket sales, merch sales, and licensing/sync placement).
62 Music and Copyright, SME and WMG the Biggest Market Share Winners in 2021, MUSIC &
COPYRIGHT’S BLOG (Apr. 5, 2022), https://musicandcopyright.wordpress.com/2022/04/05/sme-andwmg-the-biggest-market-share-winners-in-
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With this disadvantage in negotiating power, a creator’s work is rarely
compensated at a level equal to its ultimate worth.63 A work’s value may significantly
increase over time resulting from any number of factors.64 For example, the work may
be well received and commercially successful in the marketplace; the grantee may be
exceptional in their efforts to promote the work; or additional opportunities for
exploitation may exist because of new technologies such as online and mobile platforms
that were not known or widely used at the time of the grant. 65 Statutory rights to
terminate and recapture copyrights vary depending on the following factors: the date
the copyright was secured; the identity of the original grantor; when did the transfer
or license take place; and what specific exclusive rights were transferred or licensed. 66
IP is unique in this manner, as other forms of property can often be accurately
valuated prior to, or in the earliest stages of their creation. For example, the value of
a new home can be accurately estimated before a shovel breaks through the fallow
ground. Factors such as the square footage, number of bedrooms, bathrooms,
materials, neighborhood, and comparables will provide the data needed to accurately
reflect the value of the yet to be built home. Likewise, the commercial value of a pair
of shoes or any article of clothing can be accurately estimated based on the materials,
uniqueness of the style, scarcity of the brand, the name of the designer, etc. IP –
including songs, books, films, and theatrical plays – enjoys no such advantage.67 The
bifurcated term of Copyright protection under the U.S. Copyright statutes in place
from 1790 through 1977 provided an opportunity for the original author to recapture
her transferred copyrights, and either keep them or regrant the licenses for much more
lucrative fees.68
Under the original copyright statute and the first three major revisions to the
statute, the opportunity for recapture was initially based on the length of the
2021/#:~:text=SME's%20share%20of%20all%20recorded,%25%20(see%20Figure%202).&text=The%2
0smaller%20of%20the%20three,both%20digital%20and%20physical%20sales. Market share leaders
for 2021 were Universal Music Group (26.8%), Sony Music Entertainment (18.5%), Warner Music
Group (10.5%) and Independent labels (43.2%).
63 Ken Liu, A Second Bite at the Apple: Termination Rights for Writers, SCIENCE FICTION &
FANTASY WRITERS ASSOC. (Aug. 31, 2013), https://www.sfwa.org/2013/08/31/second-bite-appletermination-rights-writers-introduction/. “Early in their careers, writers sometimes sign away
valuable rights under less than favorable terms.”
64 Ostrow, supra note 61 (discussing the key performance indicators to measure the success of a
recording, including, sales, album sales, ticket sales, merch sales, and licensing/sync placement).
65 Cunard & Gruner, supra note 48.
66 Id.
67 See Jean Folger, What You Should Know About Real Estate Valuation, INVESTOPEDIA (Dec. 31,
2021), https://www.investopedia.com/articles/realestate/12/real-estate-valuation.asp; WIPO, Valuing
Intellectual Property Assets, WIPO, https://www.wipo.int/sme/en/ip-valuation.html (last visited Nov.
11, 2022).
68 Ass’n of Research Libr., Copyright Timeline: A History of Copyright in the United States, ASS’N
OF RESEARCH LIBR., https://www.arl.org/copyright-timeline/ (last visited Oct. 30, 2022). The Copyright
Act of 1790:
granted American authors the right to print, reprint, or publish their works for a
period of 14 years and to renew for another fourteen.” “A major revision of the US
Copyright Act was completed in 1909. The bill broadened the scope of categories
protected to include all works of authorship and extended the term of protection to
28 years with a possible renewal of 28.
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Copyright term.69 Each of these statutes apportioned the term for copyright protection
for an initial period of years followed by a possible renewal period. 70 The final year of
the initial term also served as an opportunity for the original author to terminate any
assignment or exclusive transfer of copyright and reclaim the work for the renewal
term.71 As discussed earlier, the Copyright Act of 1790, “An Act for the Encouragement
of Learning, by Securing the Copies of Maps, Charts, and Books to the Authors and
Proprietors of Such Copies,” was modeled on the Statute of Anne (1710) and granted
American authors the right to print, reprint, or publish their works for a period of 14
years and to renew for another 14 years.72 Congress’s goal in drafting this statute was
to provide an incentive to authors, artists, and scientists to create original works by
providing creators with a limited monopoly. 73 The limitation was put in place to
stimulate creativity and the advancement of “science and the useful arts” through wide
public access to works in the “public domain.”74 The initial fourteen-year term of the
1790 Act was renewable as follows:
…if at the expiration of the said term, the author or authors, or any of
them be living, and a citizen or citizens of these United States, or
resident therein, the same exclusive right shall be continued to him or
them, his or their executors, administrators or assigns, for the further
term of fourteen years; Provided, He or they shall cause the title
thereof to be a second time recorded and published in the same manner
as is herein after directed, and that within six months before the
expiration of the first term of fourteen years aforesaid.75

Id.
Id.
71 USCO, Duration of Copyright, USCO (2022) 2, https://www.copyright.gov/circs/circ15a.pdf.
Under the 1909 Act, “[a] copyright lasted for a first term of 28 years from the date it was secured. The
copyright was eligible for renewal during the final, that is, 28th year, of the first term.”
72 Copyright Act of 1790, Pub. L. No. 1-15, 1 Stat. 124 (1790). The Statue of Anne was enacted by
the British parliament in 1709. The statute was An Act for the Encouragement of Learning, by vesting
the Copies of Printed Books in the authors or purchasers of such Copies, during the Times therein
mentioned. Named after Anne, Queen of Great Britain, this was the first copyright statute in the
Kingdom of Great Britain, and the first full-fledged copyright statute in the world. It was enacted in
the regnal year 1709-1710 and entered into force on April 10, 1710. The Statute of Anne, enacted by
the British parliament, had granted publishers of books legal protection for 14 years with the
commencement of the statute. It also granted 21 years of protection for any book already in print. At
the expiration of the first 14-year copyright term, the copyright re-vested in its author, if he or she
were still alive, for a further term of 14 years.
73 LSU Libr., Copyright Basics, LSU LIBR., https://www.lib.lsu.edu/services/copyright/basics (last
visited Nov. 11, 2022) (stating, copyright… “is a limited monopoly given to authors and creators of
intellectual property to control uses of their work”). See also Copyright Timeline, supra note 68:
69
70

It granted American authors the right to print, reprint, or publish their work for a
period of 14 years and to renew for another fourteen. The law was meant to provide
an incentive to authors, artists, and scientists to create original works by providing
creators with a monopoly.
74
75

Copyright Timeline, supra note 68.
Copyright Act of 1790, Pub. L. No. 1-15, 1 Stat. 124 (1790).
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A fair amount of this initial act was dedicated to administrative functions and
requirements such as filing and registration. 76 However, no further discussion is
dedicated to renewal, and there is no mention of termination, likely because the
renewal period served as a de facto opportunity for termination of any grant of
copyright.77
The 1831 revision of the Copyright Act extended the term of protection to 28 years
with no change to the 14-year extension. 78 This revision also added musical
compositions to the list of statutorily protected works, specifically for reproductions of
compositions in printed form (the public performance right was not yet recognized). 79
The statute of limitations for copyright actions was also extended from one year to two
years. 80 Among the reasons given by Congress for the extended term was to give
American authors the same protection as those in Europe. 81 The extension applied to
both future works and those works still enjoying copyright protection.82
The 1870 revision made no changes to the term of protection.83 Its major purpose
was to move the administration of copyright registrations from the individual district
courts to the Library of Congress Copyright Office.84 In 1886, the Berne Convention,
which is arguably the most important international treaty governing copyright law,
was enacted.85 However, the U.S. did not join the Berne Convention until 1988. 86
The 1909 revision of the Copyright Act broadened the scope of categories protected
to include all works of authorship and extended the term of protection to 28 years with
a possible renewal of 28 additional years.87 The record indicates that as Congress was
drafting the 1909 Act, they took great efforts to address the difficulty of balancing the
public interest with proprietor’s rights:
The main object to be desired in expanding copyright protection
accorded to music has been to give the composer an adequate return
for the value of his composition, and it has been a serious and difficult
task to combine the protection of the composer with the protection of
the public, and to so frame an act that it would accomplish the double
purpose of securing to the composer an adequate return for all use
made of his composition and at the same time prevent the formation of
oppressive monopolies, which might be founded upon the very rights
granted to the composer for the purpose of protecting his interests.88
Copyright Timeline, supra note 68.
Id.
78 Copyright Act of 1831, 4 Stat. 436 (1831).
79 Id.
80 Id.
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 Copyright Act of 1831, 4 Stat. 436 (1831) at 1870 (Revision of Copyright Act).
84 Id.
85 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, revised July
24, 1971, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 99-27, 828 U.N.T.S. 221, ART. 23 [hereinafter Berne Convention]. The
Berne Convention provided for mutual recognition of copyright between sovereign nations and
promoted the development of international norms in copyright protection.
86 Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, H.R. 4262, 100th Cong. § 3 (1988).
87 Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, 35 Stat. 1075 (1909).
88 Renewal of Copyright, H.R. Rep. No. 2222, 60th Cong. § 7 (1909).
76
77
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While the original statute of 1790 was followed by major revisions of the Act
implemented in 1831, 1870, and 1909, it was the 1976 Act that first eliminated the
bifurcated term of protection.89 The 1976 Act preempted all previous copyright law and
extended the term of protection to life of the author plus 50 years, with works for hire
being protected for 75 years from publication or 100 years from creation, whichever
expired first.90 As the U.S. was preparing to join the Berne Convention, the transition
from a bifurcated term of years, to one based upon the life of the author plus an
additional 50 years was among the changes Congress implemented in order for the
U.S. to come within its requirements.91 The other major changes between the 1909 and
1976 Acts stimulated by the Berne Convention included abolishing all formalities to
copyright protection, namely copyright registration, notice, and general publication,
all of which were required for copyright protection under the 1909 Act. 92 These
formalities were replaced with the singular requirement that the work must be fixed
in a tangible medium of expression. § 102 of 1976 Act states:
Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in original
works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now
known or later developed, from which they can be perceived,
reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid
of a machine or device.93
As the new statute relates to copyright termination, with the bifurcated term
being eliminated, it was necessary to provide for a new benchmark date for the
termination of copyright transfers.94 The old statute had a neat cut off point – the end
Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976).
17 U.S.C. §106 (2022). In 1998, with the passage of the Sony Bono Copyright Term Extension
Act (CTEA), the term for protection was expanded to life of the author plus 70 years, with works for
hire being expanded to 95 years from publication or 120 years from creation, whichever expired first.
The CTEA also added 20 years to the term of all works that were still under copyright protection at
the time of the statute’s enactment, e.g., 1909 Act works that were still under copyright protection
saw their terms expanded by 20 years to a possible maximum of 95 years instead of 75 if all renewals
had been filed. The 1976 Act also implemented additional protections for authors and a codification of
the fair use defense and first sale doctrine. The 1976 Act covered scope and subject matter of works
covered, exclusive rights, copyright term, copyright notice and copyright registration, copyright
infringement, fair use and defenses, and remedies to infringement. The new act also provided
protection to unpublished works.
91 WIPO, Summary of the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works
(1886), WIPO, https://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/berne/summary_berne.html (last visited Nov. 11,
2022).
92 Id.
93 17 U.S.C. §102(a) (2022) (stating works of authorship include the following categories: 1)
literary works; 2) musical works, including any accompanying words; 3) dramatic works, including
any accompanying music; 4) pantomimes and choreographic works; 5) pictorial, graphic, and
sculptural works; 6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works; 7) sound recordings; and 8)
architectural works).
94
USCO,
Notices
of
Termination,
USCO,
https://www.copyright.gov/recordation/termination.html (last visited Nov. 11, 2022). “Grants may
only be terminated during a specific statutory window of time and must specify the date that the
termination goes into effect. The effective date must fall within a five-year ‘termination period,’ which
is based on factors set forth in sections 203, 304(c), or 304(d), as applicable.”
89
90
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of the initial term – upon which to build the author’s opportunity to terminate.95 With
the new term having no such natural cutoff point, Congress endeavored to create a
similar point at which the author could recapture her rights. The codification of these
rights can be found in § 203 of the Copyright Act of 1976, which states:
In the case of any work other than a work made for hire, the exclusive
or nonexclusive grant of a transfer or license of copyright or of any right
under a copyright, executed by the author on or after January 1, 1978,
otherwise than by will, is subject to termination.96
As stated in the introduction, this article argues that the language from the above
section inadvertently creates an undue burden upon original authors that has
potentially punitive consequences. The specific language at issue reads as follows:
Termination of the grant may be effected at any time during a period
of five years beginning at the end of thirty-five years from the date of
execution of the grant; or, if the grant covers the right of publication of
the work, the period begins at the end of thirty-five years from the date
of publication of the work under the grant or at the end of forty years
from the date of execution of the grant, whichever term ends earlier.97
Under the effective date of termination, all rights under this title that were
covered by the terminated grants revert to the author, authors, and other persons
owning termination interests.98
V. WHAT WAS THE LEGISLATIVE INTENT?
It is imperative to look at not only the final statute, but also the legislative intent
of the Congress as the law was being crafted. The statutory termination and recapture
provisions of the statute aim to rectify what Congress perceived as a bargaining
imbalance. It allows authors or their statutory successors an opportunity to reap the
enhanced or new value of the work by renegotiating the existing grant with the same
grantee on more favorable terms. It can also be done by entering a new and presumably
more advantageous arrangement with third parties.99

95

Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, 35 Stat. 1075 (1909) at § 13.
The proprietor of such copyright shall be entitled to a renewal and extension of the
copyright in such work for the further term of twenty-eight years when application
for such renewal and extension shall have been made to the copyright office and
duly registered therein within one year prior to the expiration of the original term
of copyright.

17 U.S.C. § 203(a) (2022).
17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(3) (2022).
98 17 U.S.C. §203(b) (2022).
99 Cunard & Gruner, supra note 48.
96
97
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In the years leading up to the passing of the 1976 Act, Copyright Register Barbara
Ringer noted the importance of protecting author’s rights during her testimony at the
Copyright Law Revision Hearings, stating:
There is another provision which I am doubtful anyone will raise as an
issue, but I might mention in the context of the general content of the
bill. There are reforms that are of benefit to authors and artists with
respect to ownership, in addition to the longer term, and one of the
most notable of these is in section 203 of the bill. 100 Ms. Ringer
continued: Instead of the present complex and rather arbitrary and
capricious renewal provisions, it allows an author or his beneficiaries
to re-do a bad deal. In effect the present law was intended to
accomplish that result but has been most imperfect in doing this.101
Ultimately, when the statute was completed, it provided a compromise in several
ways instead of the full-throated protection of authors rights. One of those
compromises was instead of the termination being automatic, as it had been at the end
of 28 years under the 1909 Act, a transfer or license under § 203 could be terminated
only by means of an advance notice within specified time limits and under specified
conditions. 102 In her testimony at the 1974-75 hearings, Ms. Ringer defended the
compromised language of the statute and stated that it was her opinion that authors
would be much better off than they were under the 1909 Act. 103 Even with her
optimistic view of the statutory changes, it is noteworthy that she referred to the
language of chapter 2, particularly section 203, as “labyrinthine provisions.”104 Indeed,
labyrinthine is a suitable description of the statutory language.
So how does this statute potentially have punitive effects on original authors?
The 1976 House Report states that the provisions of § 203 are based on the
premise that the reversionary provisions of the 1909 Act on copyright renewal.105 It
also states that 17 U.S.C. § 24, should be eliminated, and that the proposed law should
replace those provisions with language that safeguards author against
unremunerative transfers.106 In the 1977 Report from the Copyright Office, General
Guide to the Copyright Act of 1976,107 these definitive words were stated:
It is generally acknowledged that during the early stages of the
revision effort, “the most explosive and difficult issue” concerned a
100 Copyright Law Revision, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the
Admin. of Justice of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong. 1 (1975) (statement of Barbara Ringer).
101 Id.
102 Greenberg, supra note 34, at 23.
103 Copyright Law Revision, supra note 100.
104 Id.
105 Copyright Law Revision, H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, 94th Cong. § 2 (1976) at 124-28.
106 ROBERT A. GORMAN, ET AL., COPYRIGHT CASES AND MATERIALS 450 (8th ed. 2011). A provision
of this sort is needed because of the unequal bargaining position of authors, resulting in part from the
impossibility of determining a work’s value until it has been exploited. Section 203 reflects a practical
compromise that will further the objectives of the copyright law while recognizing the problems and
legitimate needs of all interests involved.
107 See
USCO, General Guide to the Copyright Act of 1976, USCO (1977) 6:1,
https://www.copyright.gov/reports/guide-to-copyright.pdf.
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provision for protecting authors against unfair copyright transfers. The
aim was to protect authors against unremunerative transfers and to
get rid of the complexity, awkwardness, and unfairness of the renewal
provision. As both the House and Senate reports note, the problem
stems from the unequal bargaining position of authors and from the
impossibility of determining a work’s value until it has been
exploited.108
Discussing the potential impact of section 203, noted author and critic Elizabeth
Janeway, representing the Authors League of America, noted:
The termination clause is one of the most important terms in the Bill.
Like the present renewal clause, its purpose is to safeguard the author
against being compelled to transfer his rights for the entire copyright
term. Often these transfers deprive him, and his family, of income from
uses of a work during the latter part of its copyright…this clause
represents a compromise between those concerned with the problem. 109
During these same hearings, Tom Mahoney of the Society of Magazine Writers,
agreed with Ms. Janeway’s statement and said the following:
So, too, we hail the prudent provisions of §§203 and 304(c) of this bill,
limiting the duration of an author’s assignment of his rights to a period
of thirty-five years. Again, we feel confident that other authors’
organizations will have more to say on this subject thoroughly
coincident with our views. We content ourselves, therefore, by saying
that, though no other provisions of this bill have, in the years of study
of which is the product, been more hotly debated between authors and
users, the resulting harmonization and compromise of their conflicting
views is as statesmanlike as it is necessary.110
Even prior to the 1976 Act, there was clear intent to protect authors with the
renewal term provisions of the 1909 Act.111 In 1962, reflecting on the impetus of having
a renewal term under the 1909 Act, The Copyright Law Revision Report of the Register
of Copyrights on the General Revision of the U.S. Copyright Law stated,
The primary purpose of [the reversionary provision] was to protect the
author and his family against his unprofitable or improvident
disposition of the copyright. The renewal copyright was intended to
revert to them so that they could negotiate new contracts for the
further exploitation of the work.”112
Id.
Copyright Law Revision, supra note 100 (statement of Elizabeth Janeway).
110 Id. (statement of Tom Mahoney).
111 Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, 35 Stat. 1075 (1909).
112 House Comm. Print, Copyright Law Revision, Report of the Register of Copyrights on the
General Revision of the U.S. Copyright Law, U.S. GOV. PRINTING OFF. (1961) 53,
https://www.copyright.gov/history/1961_registers_report.pdf.
108
109
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But is the statute, as currently written achieving its goal? In too many ways, it is
failing miserably. A review of the congressional hearings held prior to the creation of
the 1976 Act reveal there were legitimate concerns regarding the copyright renewal
process under the bifurcated term of the 1909 Act.113 Chief among those concerns were
the complicated administrative process, the cost of renewals – particularly for artists
with many original works, and the ongoing problem of authors or their heirs missing
out on the renewals because they were either unaware of the deadlines or
administrative requirements. 114 Witnesses who testified to these concerns spoke
positively about the potential change to the life-plus 50 terms because of its elimination
of these challenges.115 For example, Elizabeth Janeway testified that many authors
missed out on their renewal because of either ignorance or inadvertence, while others
were confounded by the high cost of renewal with some of them having numerous
works that were due for renewal.116 Likewise, James Blish, Vice President of Science
Fiction Writers of America, testified that the requirements of the renewal process
represented a considerable expense, and “an even more considerable nuisance.”117 Mr.
Blish, when testifying about the common occurrence of authors losing their renewal
term because of failure to satisfy administrative requirements stated, “…it has
happened in the past, and I am sure it will happen in the future, that authors have
lost very considerable properties; either through their own inattention or, more
seriously, through the inattention of their heirs.”118 Their testimony was specifically
aimed at the transition from the renewal process under the 1909 Act to a life-plus term
that would not require renewal.119 Ms. Janeway and Mr. Blish’s concerns are directly
applicable to the concerns presented by this article regarding the current requirements
for copyright termination under the 1976 Act – that is, the cost of the process, and
perhaps more urgently, the administrative complications and requirements, i.e., the
strict 5-year window and 2–10-year notice requirements.120
Not all parties would agree that there is a problem. Some would say that it is the
responsibility of the artist to keep up with the law and know the status of their works
or that recordings should be deemed works for hire and thus not subject to
termination.121 Others would say there should be no right to recapture at all.122 In fact,
major record labels throughout the U.S. are going to great lengths to avoid the legal

Id.
Id.
115 Copyright Law Revision, supra note 100 (statement of Elizabeth Janeway), at 51.
116 Id.
117 Id.
118 Id.
119 Id.
120 Copyright Law Revision, supra note 100 (statement of Elizabeth Janeway), at 51. The author
has worked pro bono on a copyright termination for an ailing songwriter who composed a successful
song and now is faced with major health issues and virtually no income. The challenge of handling a
matter like this one for a songwriter with 10 or 20 hit songs would be cost prohibitive for the filing
fees alone. These requirements include the strict five-year window and two-to-ten-year notice
requirements.
121 Bob Donnelly, Everything You Need to Know About Copyright Reversions, 1 ST. JOHN’S ENT.
ARTS & SPORTS L.J. 1, 3 (2012).
122 Copyright Law Revision, supra note 100 (statement of Elizabeth Janeway), at 51.
113
114
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requirement of returning masters to artists who have filed copyright terminations for
sound recordings.123
This issue is seen in Waite v. UMG Rec.. 124 Waite is a class action involving
recording artists whose albums were released by predecessors in interest of defendant
UMG.125 Artists signed in the 1970s and 1980s that granted copyright in their works
to UMG’s predecessor recording companies.126 These grants allowed those companies
to market, distribute, and sell the artists’ sound recordings.127 While each member of
the class filed termination notices, UMG disputed the validity of those terminations.128
The plaintiffs argued that UMG infringed on the artists’ copyrights by continuing to
market and sell the recordings after the effective date of termination passed.129
Regarding the recordings whose effective dates of termination have not yet
passed, the plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment of certain legal rights and duties
of the parties, as well as an injunction restraining the defendant from continuing to
deny and disregard the termination notices.130 UMG filed a motion to dismiss, arguing
that the claims were barred by the Copyright Act’s three-year statute of limitations
because the plaintiffs were put on notice of an authorship and ownership dispute when
they signed their contracts in the 1970s and 1980s.131 The district court denied UMG’s
motion, finding that “it is impossible for there to be a legally cognizable infringement
claim until a termination right vests, a valid and timely termination notice is sent, is
ignored, and the copyright’s grantee continues to distribute the work.”132 Furthermore,
the court explained that the
‘explicit purpose of Section 203 reinforces the conclusion that plaintiffs’
copyright claims could not have accrued upon the signing of their
contracts’ and that ‘authors needed statutory protection ‘because of the
unequal bargaining position of authors, resulting in part from the
impossibility of determining a work’s value until it has been
exploited.’133
Waite has not reached a final adjudication, however the district court’s ruling in
favor of the plaintiffs on the motion to dismiss noted the recurring theme of the
unequal bargaining power of the parties falls squarely in line with the statutory intent
that termination rights were created to benefit authors.134

Donnelly, supra note 121, at 3.
Waite v. UMG Rec., 450 F.Supp. 3d 430, 432 (S.D.N.Y. 2020).
125 Id.
126 Id.
127 Id.
128 Id. at 433.
129 Waite, F. Supp. 3d at 433.
130 Id.
131 Id.
132 Id. at 436.
133 Id. 438.
134 Waite, F. Supp. 3d at 432.
123
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VI. HOW DO WE FIX THIS PROBLEM?
A. Termination Language under Section 203
As Congress considers the next revision of the Copyright Act, there is an
opportunity to fill in the gaps and address many issues that exist with the current
statute.135 The language of 17 U.S.C. §203 (a)(3), is primed for revision.136 As discussed
earlier, the legislative aim of the termination provision was to protect authors against
unremunerative transfers and to get rid of the complexity, awkwardness, and
unfairness of the renewal provision.137 Intent notwithstanding, the current statute is
complex, awkward, and arguably unfair to creators.138
Suggested revised language for §203(a):
(3) Termination of the grants may be effected at any time after the end of thirtyfive years from the date of execution of the grant;
(4) Deleted

135 Amy Gilbert, The Time Has Come: A Proposed Revision to 17 U.S.C. § 203, 66 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 807, 809 (2016). “The major issues stem from the overbroad inalienability of the provision and
the far too expansive notice requirement.”
136 Id.
137 Id.
138 17 U.S.C. § 203(a) (2022) (stating in pertinent part):

(3) Termination of the grant may be effected at any time during a period of five
years beginning at the end of thirty-five years from the date of execution of the
grant; or, if the grant covers the right of publication of the work, the period begins
at the end of thirty-five years from the date of publication of the work under the
grant or at the end of forty years from the date of execution of the grant, whichever
term ends earlier.
(4) The termination shall be effected by serving an advance notice in writing, signed
by the number and proportion of owners of termination interests required under
clauses (10 and (2) of this subsection, or by their duly authorized agents, upon the
grantee or the grantee’s successor in title.
(A) The notice shall state the effective date of the termination which shall fall
within the five-year period specified by clause (3) of this subsection, and the
notice shall be served not less than two or more than ten years before that date.
A copy of the notice shall be recorded in the Copyright Office before the
effective date of termination, as a condition to its taking effect.
(B) The notice shall comply, in form, content, and manner of service, with
requirements that the Register of Copyrights shall prescribe by regulation).
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B. Revising the Work for Hire Language
In addition to the language changes in the requirements for termination, an
additional change that would assist in the stated goal of protecting authors involves
the work for hire loophole. According to the House Report of 1976, the right of
termination would not apply to “works made for hire,” which is one of the principal
reasons the definition of that term assumed importance in the development of the
bill.139 § 101 of the Copyright Act of 1976 provides the definition for a work made for
hire and creates a mechanism whereby authors would not be considered owners of
these works.140 Under the first subdivision of this provision, when a work is created by
an employee within the scope of employment, it is presumed to be made for hire unless
the parties agree otherwise in a written instrument.141 This portion of the statute does
not necessarily need revision. However, the second provision has proven to be a
loophole through which the unbalanced bargaining position of creators has arguably
been unduly exploited by their corporate contractual partners.142 Subdivision 2 applies
to specially commissioned works that fall within one of the nine enumerated categories
of works. 143 The fact that these works are immune from termination rights again
contradicts the stated intent of copyright protection, that is, to incentivize authors to
create more works and thereby enrich the public.
One of the compromises in creating the termination provisions was in this work
for hire language.144 Ms. Ringer noted that achieving compromise on the changes to
the doctrine of work made for hire was “extraordinarily difficult to achieve.” 145 The
right of termination would not apply to “works made for hire,” exempting works
prepared by an employee within the scope of their employment and certain works
prepared on special order or commission.146
The result of this loophole is that those with the financial advantage, and the
position of power in negotiation (i.e., corporations such as record companies) are
139
140

Copyright Law Revision, H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, 94th Cong. § 2 (1976) at 124-28.
17 U.S.C. §101 (2022).
(1) a work prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her employment; or
(2) a work specially ordered or commissioned for use as a contribution to a collective
work, as a part of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, as a translation, as a
supplementary work, as a compilation, as an instructional text, as a test, as answer
material for a test, or as an atlas, if the parties expressly agree in a written
instrument signed by them that the work shall be considered a work made for hire.

Leaffer, supra note 10, at 187.
Mark Fowler, Cultivating a Healthy Loathing for “Work Made for Hire” Agreements, RIGHTS
OF WRITERS (May 26, 2011), http://www.rightsofwriters.com/2011/05/cultivating-healthy-loathing-forwork.html:
141
142

The ‘work made for hire’ clause is the bete noire of freelance writers. While the
clause is frequently very unfair to authors, it is not unfair in all circumstances; it’s
never your friend, but there are times when it is not necessarily your enemy.
17 U.S.C. § 101 (2022).
Copyright Law Revision, supra note 110, at 1889.
145 Id.
146 Id. at 2079.
143
144
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systematically proceeding as a matter of business operation to secure as much of the
authors’ creations as works made for hire.147 This allows those in power to avoid the
termination rights that the statute provides to authors. 148 This is not unlike the
circumvention that occurred under the 1909 Act after Fred Fisher Music v. M. Witmark
& Sons and Miller Music Corp. v. Charles N. Daniels.149 In Fisher, an assignment by
an author of the renewal term, before that right had vested, was held to be binding on
the author.150 This holding, in conflict with the stated congressional purpose of the twoterm copyright, led to most deals being drafted for the author to assign his renewal
term in the initial contract. 151 To sell their works, authors were pressured into
conveying their renewal rights in the second copyright term. 152 This holding was
further expanded by Miller, where the Supreme Court held that when an assigning
author dies before the renewal vested, the right to the second term vests in the
statutory successors under § 24 of the 1909 Act.153 The result Miller was that assignees
of renewal rights sought to bind all the potential statutory successors, such as the
author’s spouse, by written contract, again contrary to congressional intent.154 Fred
Fisher and its progeny undermined the basic policy of the renewal grant, which was to
protect the unequal bargaining position of many authors.155

147 Morris Music Law, Work For Hire Contract Basics and Services, MORRIS MUSIC LAW, PC,
https://www.morrismusiclaw.com/work-for-hire (last visited Nov. 11, 2022). “A work for hire contract
is used in almost all music recording projects to ensure that a label (or a DIY artist) owns everything
created as a result of the services of others involved in the recording process such as session musicians,
producers, engineers, mixers, and masterers.” Id.
148
See
generally
USCO,
Works
Made
for
Hire,
USCO
(2021),
https://www.copyright.gov/circs/circ30.pdf.
149 See generally Fred Fisher Music v. M. Witmark & Sons, 318 U.S. 643 (1943); Miller Music
Corp. v. Charles N. Daniels, 362 U.S. 373 (1960).
150 Fred Fisher, 318 U.S. at 643.
151 Id. at 663. (Black, J., Douglas, J., and Murphy, J. dissenting) (stating in part, the analysis of
the language and history of the copyright law in the dissenting opinion of Judge Frank in the court
below, demonstrates a Congressional purpose to reserve the renewal privilege for the personal benefit
of authors and their families).
152 Peter S. Menell & David Nimmer, Pooh-Poohing Copyright Law’s “Inalienable” Termination
Rights, 57 J. OF THE COPYRIGHT SOC’Y 799, 805 (2010).

What Fisher permitted under the 1909 Act, Congress expressly forbade in the
amended legislation. In 1961, the Copyright Office submitted a comprehensive
study of copyright law to Congress so that it might revise the 1909 Act. The report
noted that the ‘reversionary feature of the present renewal system has largely failed
to accomplish its primary purpose.’
Miller, 362 U.S. at 374.
Leaffer, supra note 10, at 239. Courts upheld these agreements so long as they were supported
by adequate consideration and were written in express language granting rights in the renewal term.
155 Fisher, 318 U.S. at 643; Miller, 362 U.S. at 373. The rationale behind the legislation was to
“safeguard authors against unremunerative transfers” and improve the “bargaining position of
authors” by giving them a second chance to negotiate more advantageous grants in their works after
the works had been sufficiently “exploited” to determine their “value.” Id. See also Copyright Law
Revision, H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, 94th Cong. § 2 (1976) at 124; House Report on Copyright Act of 1976,
H.R. Rep. No. 94-176 (1976) at 124. Congress sought to foster this purpose by permitting an author’s
heirs to use the increased bargaining power conferred by the imminent threat of statutory termination
to enter into new, more advantageous grants.
153
154
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VII. CONCLUSION
The stated purposes of copyright protection include encouraging the creations of
new works of authorship by providing limited monopolies to authors, wherein they may
exploit their work; providing a mechanism wherein licensees may expand the market
for these works and benefit from their investment; and protecting the public by way of
a robust public domain.156 With the inherent imbalance of negotiation power between
authors and publishers or recording companies, the opportunity for an author to have
a second bite at the apple is theoretically achieved through the language of the
termination provisions of the copyright statute.157 Unfortunately, the current language
of the § 203 too often creates an illusory promise of that second opportunity for authors
to reap the benefits of their creative works. As evidenced by the legislative history
during the creation of the 1976 Act, and the history of the Act itself from 1790 to the
present day, an illusory promise was never the intent of the statute. 158 As Congress
reimagines the copyright laws, termination of transfer is an area that is ripe for a
major revision. The most logical starting point for this revision would be to eliminate
the complex maze of requirements for terminations and allow transferred works to
automatically terminate as a matter of law after a specified number of years. The
result would satisfy the original legislative goals of the statute and would allow
authors to truly reap the fruits of their labors.

Leaffer, supra note 10, at 8.
Dana Habler, Copyright Termination Rights: Giving Artists Their Second Bite at the Apple,
PACE
INTELL.
PROP.,
SPORTS
&
ENT.
L.
F.
(Apr.
21,
2013),
https://pipself.blogs.pace.edu/2013/04/21/copyright-termination-rights-giving-artists-their-secondbite-at-the-apple/.
158 Dylan Gilbert, It’s Time To Pull Back the Curtain on the Termination Right, PUBLIC
KNOWLEDGE (Dec. 5, 2019), https://publicknowledge.org/its-time-to-pull-back-the-curtain-on-thetermination-right/.
156
157

Unfortunately, many artists and creators appear unable to exercise what is
supposed to be an inalienable right. Court records, academic studies, and press
reports all point to dysfunction within the termination right regime. The right is
complex to execute, and that has allowed problems to take root as artists struggle
to fulfill obscure eligibility, timing, and filing formalities which together create
significant hurdles that are difficult (if not impossible) to overcome without
expensive legal representation. Even when artists meet their statutory obligations,
they can find themselves entangled in lengthy and expensive litigation to resolve
ambiguities in the law and its application, ranging from judicial ‘work for hire’
determinations to disputes over the statute of limitations. Artists shouldn’t have to
become legal experts or hire pricey lawyers just to benefit from their work.

